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1 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici are law professors engaged in study of the 
admiralty and maritime law of the United States. 
They have published extensively about it, and cur-
rently teach or have spent their professional careers 
teaching, about it. 
The only interest of amici is in optimal develop-
ment of the body of U.S. law that governs in cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Indeed, we 
differ on how various questions concerning the mari-
time law of punitive damages in this case should be 
answered in general and how those answers should 
be applied to the award in this case. 
We agree, however, that answers of some kind 
are overdue. Moreover, we agree on the approach that 
a court should take in formulating the maritime law 
of the United States and on the sources to which such 
a court might look in the process. We therefore file 
this amicus brief to assist the Court in its resolution 
of this significant case. 
--------·--------
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part. No person or entity, other than the Maritime Law Institute 
of Tulane University, which paid for the printing of this brief, 
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission 
of this brief. This brief is filed with the written consent of the 
parties, reflected in letters on file with the Clerk. 
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ARGUMENT 
The petition should be granted to resolve 
critical questions of national importance 
regarding whether and under what circum-
stances federal maritime law allows punitive 
damages. 
In this case, the Ninth Circuit has reviewed at 
length the award of punitive damages for conformity 
with this Court's interpretation of the Constitution's 
guarantee of due process, but its attention to this 
constitutional question appears to have distracted it 
from pronouncing federal maritime law. More atten-
tion to questions about the general maritime law of 
punitive damages might have made constitutional 
rev1ew unnecessary. 
A. This is a maritime case governed by fed-
eral maritime law. 
This is a case of harm to the livelihoods of com-
mercial and subsistence fishermen caused by a spill 
of crude oil from a tank vessel stranded on a reef in 
Prince William Sound, part of the "navigable waters 
of the United States" opening to the Gulf of Alaska. A 
federal jury found that the stranding was caused by 
negligent navigation and that Exxon, the shipowner, 
was liable for income unrealized as a consequence of 
days lost to fishing and distress to the fish stocks of the 
Sound. Compensatory damages were awarded. Other 
cases, brought on behalf of the State of Alaska and the 
United States, raised issues of Exxon's liability for 
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damages to the environment and natural resources; 
they were settled. This case was not settled but tried, 
and because Exxon has not appealed from the judg-
ment that it was liable to these plaintiffs for compen-
satory damages, the most important matters still in 
dispute are whether punitive damages are also ap-
propriate, and if so, how much. These are matters to 
be governed by federal maritime law. 
The casualty that gives rise to this case, a ves-
sel's stranding, was maritime, as are the alleged 
torts, so this case is subject to federal judicial power 
pursuant to Article III, Section 2, as a case "of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction." (Contrary to the 
general preference for an interpretation of the words 
of the Constitution that leaves none of them redun-
dant, it is well settled that "admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction" does not describe two sets of cases, but 
one. In this brief, "admiralty" will ordinarily be used 
with reference to a federal court with the power to 
hear cases of this sort, and "maritime" will be used 
with reference to the body of law applied in such 
cases.) See generally Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995) (clari-
fying the requirements for admiralty tort jurisdic-
tion); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990) (same). 
In section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Con-
gress vested the federal district courts with jurisdic-
tion to hear "cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction." 1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789). At the same 
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time, under the so-called Saving to Suitors Clause, 
Congress authorized state courts2 to continue hearing 
some of the cases, that is, those for which the com-
mon law (as distinct from maritime law) also pro-
vided a remedy. Id. at 77. This scheme, by which 
federal district courts are authorized to hear any case 
within admiralty jurisdiction and to implement 
certain remedies exclusive to maritime law, while 
state courts are authorized to hear those cases other-
wise within admiralty jurisdiction that are suited for 
ordinary remedies, is preserved in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 
(2000). 
Because this case is within admiralty jurisdic-
tion, it is presumptively governed by federal law, not 
state law. Yamaha Motor Corp. USA v. Calhoun, 516 
U.S. 199, 206 (1996); East River S.S. Corp. v. Trans-
america Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). As the 
parties have acknowledged and the courts below 
agreed, the governing federal law is maritime law, 
which is made not only in treaties, Acts of Congress, 
2 Under the same theory that permits state courts sitting at 
common law to hear maritime cases, the Saving to Suitors 
Clause also permits federal courts sitting on "the law side" (i.e., 
exercising jurisdiction on some basis other than admiralty) to 
hear maritime cases. See, e.g., Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operat-
ing Co., 358 U.S. 354, 376-77 (1959) (explaining that federal 
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction could hear maritime 
cases under the Saving to Suitors Clause in the same way that 
state courts did). Indeed, the district court in this case was 
sitting on "the law side," which explains why there was a jury 
verdict in a maritime case when admiralty courts do not gener-
ally have juries. 
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and federal regulations, but also in the decisions of 
courts, both state and federal. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 
v. James N. Kirby Pty, Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004) 
("Because the grant of admiralty jurisdiction and the 
power to make admiralty law are mutually depend-
ent, the two are often intertwined in our cases.") 
'When maritime law is made by judges in case deci-
sions, it is made in a manner similar to that for 
making common law, and such judge-made law is 
commonly referred to as "general" maritime law cto 
distinguish it from law made otherwise, that is, in 
treaties, statutes, and regulations). East River S.S. 
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
864-65 ( 1986) ("Drawn from state and federal sources, 
the general maritime law is an amalgam of tradi-
tional common law rules, modifications of those rules, 
and newly created rules."). See Robert Force, Admi-
ralty and Maritime Law 21 (2004); Thomas J. 
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law§ 5-1 (4th 
ed. 2004); David J. Sharpe, Admiralty Jurisdiction: 
The Power over Cases, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 1149·(2005). As 
substantive law made sometimes by federal judges, 
general maritime law survived Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
B. The Ninth Circuit neglected its obligation 
to articulate the federal maritime law re-
quirements for punitive damages. 
The body of our maritime law falls short of a 
comprehensive code. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallen-
tire, 477 U.S. 207, 216 (1986). Certain aspects of the 
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general maritime law have been greatly refined by 
Congress and the courts, while others have not - at 
least not yet. The law of punitive damages is one of 
those aspects that have yet to be refined, and this 
case is pregnant with such unresolved issues. 
That the general maritime law of the United 
States empowers courts to award punitive damages 
in maritime cases was suggested by this Court as 
early as 1818, in The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. (16 
U.S.) 546, and confirmed in dicta in 1893, in Lake 
Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 108-
09. Lower courts have generally proceeded on the 
basis that they are so empowered. See, e.g., CEH, Inc. 
v. FN Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 699 (1st Cir. 1995); 
Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain 
Growers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1379, 1387 (9th Cir. 1985); In 
re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 
1972). See generally David W. Robertson, Punitive 
Damages in American Maritime Law, 28 J. Mar. L. & 
Com. 73 (1997). 
Nevertheless, as the Fifth Circuit has observed, 
that the general maritime law empowers courts to 
award punitive damages has not yet formed the basis 
for a holding by this Court. See Galveston County 
Navigation Dist. No. 1 v. Hopson Towing Co., 92 F.3d 
353, 359 n.ll (5th Cir. 1996); see also In re Diamond 
B Marine Serv., Inc., Nos. 99-951 & 99-984, 2000 WL 
222847 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2000). In certain maritime 
cases permitted by the Saving to Suitors Clause, 28 
U.S.C. § 1333, state courts also apply federal mari-
time law. Courts of Louisiana have expressed doubt 
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lately that federal maritime law authorizes punitive 
damages in any case. See, e.g., Boucvalt v. Sea Trac 
Offshore Serv., Inc., 943 So. 2d 1204, 1207-08 (La. 
App. 2006). We think it therefore fair to say that a 
rule of federal maritime law allowing punitive dam-
ages has yet to be "judicially established as part of 
the body of federal admiralty law in this country." 
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 
310, 316 (1955). 
Even in those federal circuits where it has been 
assumed that federal maritime law allows for puni-
tive damages in some cases, it is not agreed that a 
shipowner-employer can be liable vicariously for 
punitive damages when those misbehaving are em-
ployed as a vessel's crew or her captain. Borrowing 
from the , the First and Ninth Circuits appear to 
agree that punitive damages against a shipowner are 
warranted by federal maritime law for qualifying 
misbehavior on the part of a ship's captain because of 
the managerial nature of that position. See Seafarer, 
70 F.3d at 704-05; Protectus Alpha, 767 F.2d at 1385-
87. Citing to an American treatise, the Seventh 
Circuit in 1896 found the general rule of maritime 
law to be that "the owners of a vessel are liable for all 
injuries caused by the misconduct, negligence, or 
unskillfulness of the master, provided the act be done 
while acting within the scope of his authority as 
master." The State of Missouri, 76 F. 376, 379 (7th 
Cir. 1896) (citing 2 Theophilus Parsons, A Treatise on 
the Law of Shipping 26 (1869)). On the other hand, 
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the Fifth and Sixth Circuits enforce a strict complic-
ity rule traceable to The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. at 
558-59, and Lake Shore, 147 U.S. at 108-09. See In re 
P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 650-52 (5th 
Cir. 1989); United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 
F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1969). 
Regarding at least two other unsettled but perti-
nent issues of the general maritime law of punitive 
damages, the Ninth Circuit neglected in this case 
even to say what the law is. To Exxon's argument 
that federal maritime law should not allow punitive 
damages when punishment and deterrence are oth-
erwise assured, the Ninth Circuit replied only that: 
Exxon's argument has some force as logic 
and policy. But it has no force, in the absence 
of precedent, to establish that the law, or the 
Constitution, bars punitive damages in these 
circumstances. Because we have not been 
made aware of a principle of law pursuant to 
which we should strike a punitive damages 
award on the ground that the conduct had 
already been sufficiently punished and de-
terred, we reject the argument. 
In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1226 (9th Cir. 
2001), reprinted at Pet. App. 68a. 
The proposition that federal maritime law could be 
drawn from a principle that limits punitive damages 
when sufficient deterrence and punishment is other-
wise assured is at least suggested in Thyssen, Inc. v. 
S.S. Fortune Star, 777 F.2d 57 (1985), where the 
Second Circuit, per Judge Friendly, reversed an 
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award of punitive damages against the time charterer 
of a vessel for improper stowage ("deviation") said to 
be by order of the master or the chief mate in part 
because 
the deterring effect of punitive damages is se-
verely diluted when the actors are employees 
not of the person held liable but of another 
whom he has hired to perform his tasks. And, 
as pointed out above, the argument for strain-
ing to award punitive damages is particularly 
weak in the case of deviation where heavy 
sanctions exist in any event." 
I d. at 68. 
Likewise, to Exxon's argument that the maritime 
law should require evidence of recklessness that is 
clear and convincing, the Ninth Circuit answered 
only that a lower standard was constitutionally 
permissible and, in the absence of established prece-
dent particular to maritime law, the standard of proof 
generally applied in federal civil cases should apply. 
Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1232-33, reprinted at Pet. 
App. 79a-80a. In Alaska, state law calls for clear and 
convincing evidence of misconduct qualifying for 
punitive damages. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 09.17.020 
(2006). The Ninth Circuit appears to have begged the 
question about maritime law by defaulting to what it 
describes as the standard generally applied in federal 
civil cases. 
A bedrock assumption underpinning federal 
maritime law is that the constitutional grant of 
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jurisdiction and law making was intended to foster 
uniformity and consistency for the benefit of mari-
time commerce. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby 
Pty, Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 28-29 (2004); American Dredg-
ing Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 451 (1994) (quoting 
The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 558, 575 (1875)); 
see also Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 
738-39 (1961); see Schoenbaum, supra, § 4-1.3 
C. In formulating the general maritime law, 
this Court can look to a wide variety of dif-
ferent sources. 
As amici we do not suggest the proper source 
from which to draw the maritime law for punitive 
damages. In the past, this Court has tapped various 
sources for a rule that best serves the policy that 
ought to control under the circumstances. Rules 
prevailing in the codes of the maritime nations of 
3 But this Court has observed that the requirement for 
uniform maritime law is not absolute, American Dredging, 510 
U.S. at 451, and, under certain circumstances, has allowed 
resort to state law when no rule of federal maritime law has 
been established, so long as it would not "work material preju-
dice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or 
interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in 
its international and interstate relations." I d. at 44 7; see also 
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996) (damages 
available for the wrongful death of a non-seafarer is an issue 
maritime but local so that state law could be applied); see 
generally Schoenbaum, supra, § 4-2. Here, the pressing question 
however is not whether state law will suffice, but where to turn 
for content when making federal maritime law instead. 
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Europe and approved by that continent's leading 
jurists have long proved persuasive. See, e.g., Insur-
ance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. (78 U.S.) 1, 23-24 (1870) 
aff'g De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 
1815) (No. 3,776) (Story, J.); Columbian Ins. Co. of 
Alexandria v. Ashby & Stribling, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 
331, 342 (1839). 
More recently, this Court has derived one rule of 
general maritime law with reference to a consensus 
among the world's maritime nations and the views of 
respected scholars and judges. See McDermott, Inc. v. 
Amclyde, 511 U.S. 202, 208 (1994) (recalling United 
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975)). 
Persuaded by considerations of judicial economy, the 
promotion of settlement, and consistency with exist-
ing federal maritime law, in Amclyde it drew another 
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. I d. at 211. It 
has chosen a third consistent with the law in other 
common law countries, scholarly advice, and the 
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. 
Wherever it has looked for inspiration when 
fashioning maritime law in rules of decision, this 
Court has taken care to harmonize its work with that 
of Congress. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 
19, 31-32 (1990); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 
U.S. 618, 625-26 (1978); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972); Moragne v. Central 
Gulf Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 397-99 (1970). See generally 
Force, supra, 20-21; Schoenbaum, supra, §§ 4-1,4-2. 
12 
With due regard therefore for the manifest inter-
est of Congress, this Court enjoys a range of sources 
and broad discretion in fashioning as general mari-
time law the rules of punitive damages that best 
serve the policy that ought to control under the 
circumstances. 
--------·--------
CONCLUSION 
The petition should be granted to resolve uncer-
tainty about critical aspects of the federal maritime 
law of punitive damages. 
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